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ABSTRACT
It is a commonplace today that per capita availability of fresh water is shrinking. In addition, it is well known
that some 60 per cent of global freshwater flows are contained in the 263 river basins that are shared by two
or more countries, and that around 40 per cent of the human population lives in these international basins.
These facts underscore the necessity of cooperation between states sharing fresh water, whether it is on the
surface or underground. And yet internal political forces often lead countries to maximize their use of shared
water resources without considering adequately the needs of their neighbors and co-riparians. Shrinking
availability of water will only exacerbate this tendency, resulting in the potential for increased conflict.
These factors demonstrate the importance of generally accepted legal norms governing the use by states of
shared freshwater resources. A set of such principles is contained in the 1997 United Nations Watercourses
Convention. The Convention, which is largely a codification of customary international law, contains no
provision corresponding to the general principle of “sovereignty of aquifer States” in the 2008 ILC draft
articles on Transboundary Aquifers. The ILC’s Aquifers articles should be harmonized with the UN
Convention to provide proper guidance to states sharing transboundary groundwater.
Key words: sovereignty, Harmon Doctrine, transboundary aquifers, watercourse, UN Watercourses
Convention

1. INTRODUCTION
It is a commonplace today that per capita availability of fresh water is shrinking. The math is
simple: the human population continues to increase and the amount of fresh water on Earth remains
the same. While we are often reminded that there is in fact enough fresh water on the planet even for
the nine billion people the UN projects will inhabit the globe by 2050, its uneven distribution means
that some will continue to suffer shortages – perhaps not the 1.1 billion that currently do (United
Nations, Water For Life Decade), but almost certainly an unacceptably large number.
That there will be increasing competition between countries for this shrinking supply of fresh
water also seems likely. It is well known that some 60 per cent of global freshwater flows are
contained in the 263 river basins that are shared by two or more countries, and that around 40 per cent
of the human population lives in these international basins. (UNEP Atlas, 2002.) These facts
underscore the necessity of cooperation between states sharing fresh water, whether it is on the surface
or underground, with a view to jointly managing the resource. In fact, most of the world’s available
fresh water is in the ground – “97% of all the fresh water that is potentially available for human use,”
according to UNEP (UNEP Vital Water Graphics; see also ILC 2008 Report, p. 31). And yet history
has shown that internal political forces often lead countries to maximize their use of shared water
resources without considering adequately the needs of their neighbors and co-riparians.
These factors demonstrate the importance of generally accepted legal norms governing the use by
states of shared water resources. The 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses (UN Watercourses Convention or UN Convention)
sets forth such principles. In 2008 the UN International Law Commission (ILC), which had prepared
the draft on which the UN Convention is based, adopted a set of draft articles on the Law of
Transboundary Aquifers (ILC Aquifers articles). These draft articles were annexed to a UN General
Assembly resolution later that year (UNGA Aquifers resolution). Unfortunately, the ILC Aquifers
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articles overlap with the UN Watercourses Convention and, perhaps more seriously, introduce the
novel and potentially counterproductive concept that a state has sovereignty over the portion of a
transboundary aquifer located within its territory.
In this paper I will suggest that any agreement between states based on the ILC Aquifers articles
should eliminate both the overlap with the UN Watercourses Convention and the notion of sovereignty
over shared groundwater. I will not go into detail in this short piece on matters I have developed
elsewhere (e.g., McCaffrey 2009; McCaffrey and Neville, 2010) but will focus on the main points.
2. THE 1997 UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS
DRAFT
2.1. The UN Convention
The scope of the UN Convention is defined as: “uses of international watercourses . . . for
purposes other than navigation and . . . measures of protection, preservation and management related
to the uses of those watercourses . . . .” (UN Watercourses Convention, Article 1(1).) The term
“watercourse” is defined as “a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of
their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus;”. Thus the
UN Convention applies to groundwater that is hydrologically related to surface water – a connection
that characterizes much of the world’s groundwater.
In adopting its draft articles on international watercourses, on which the UN Convention is based,
the ILC recognized that the draft did not cover groundwater that is not hydrologically connected to
surface water – for example, so-called “fossil water”. The Commission therefore adopted a Resolution
on Confined Transboundary Groundwater (ILC Groundwater Resolution) when it approved the final
version of its draft articles on international watercourses. By “confined” groundwater the ILC had in
mind that which is “not related to an international watercourse,” and therefore is not covered by the
draft articles (and thus by the UN Watercourses Convention). In the resolution the ILC notes “its view
that the principles contained in its draft articles on the law of the non-navigational uses of international
watercourses may be applied to transboundary confined groundwater”. The resolution “Commends
States to be guided by the principles contained in the draft articles on the law of the non-navigational
uses of international watercourses, where appropriate, in regulating transboundary groundwater.”
Thus the UN Convention itself covers a large percentage of the world’s transboundary groundwater
and the ILC commended the principles reflected in the watercourses articles to states for the
regulation of both transboundary groundwater covered by the draft articles and that which is not so
covered – i.e., what the ILC referred to as “confined” transboundary groundwater. One could argue,
therefore, that no further action by the ILC was necessary on transboundary groundwater. But the
preamble of the resolution recognized “the need for continuing efforts to elaborate rules pertaining to
confined transboundary groundwater.” Hence the ILC’s draft articles on the Law of Transboundary
Aquifers.
2.2. The ILC’s Aquifers articles
The ILC’s Aquifers articles, however, apply not only to what the Commission referred to as
“confined” transboundary groundwater, but also that which receives recharge from land surfaces. For
example, the articles define “recharge zone” as “the zone which contributes water to an aquifer,
consisting of the catchment area of rainfall water and the area where such water flows to an aquifer by
run-off on the ground and infiltration through soil” (ILC Aquifers articles, article 2(g).) Since the UN
Convention also covers groundwater that is recharged from the surface, there is a clear overlap
between the two instruments. This could be troublesome for water managers in states for which both
instruments were in force, since the Convention and the draft articles contain different – though not
necessarily contradictory – rules. And because so much groundwater interacts with surface water, the
likelihood that both instruments would be applicable is high. Even if the UN Convention were in
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force for a state but the Aquifers articles were not, the latter could be used as a means of interpreting
the provisions of the former relating to groundwater. This is where the notion of “sovereignty of
aquifer states” becomes particularly troublesome and mischievous.

3. SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW
3.1. The Relevant Provisions of the ILC’s Aquifers Articles
Article 3 of the ILC’s Aquifers articles provides as follows:
“Article 3
Sovereignty of aquifer States
Each aquifer State has sovereignty over the portion of a transboundary aquifer or
aquifer system located within its territory. It shall exercise its sovereignty in accordance
with international law and the present articles.”
(ILC Aquifers articles.) The UN Watercourses Convention contains no equivalent provision. The
Aquifers draft defines “aquifer State” to mean “a State in whose territory any part of a transboundary
aquifer or aquifer system is situated;”. (ILC Aquifers articles, Article 1(d).) “Aquifer” is defined as “a
permeable water bearing geological formation underlain by a less permeable layer and the water
contained in the saturated zone of the formation”, while “aquifer system” is defined as “a series of two
or more aquifers that are hydraulically connected”. (ILC Aquifers articles, Article 1 (a) and (b).) A
“transboundary aquifer” or “aquifer system” is one, “parts of which are situated in different States”.
(ILC Aquifers articles, Article 1(c).)
Thus we have one or more geologic formations, spanning two or more states, that bear water.
While the geologic formation – the “rock” – does not move, and is part of the land territory of the state
in which it is situated, the water it contains ordinarily does move, particularly if – as would often be
the case – the aquifer receives recharge, or if the water is pumped by one of the states sharing the
aquifer. Subject to what is said below, it may thus be appropriate, if tautological, to speak of a state
as having “sovereignty” over the portion of the geologic formation that is situated within its territory;
however, it is wholly inappropriate, even pernicious, to speak of a state as having “sovereignty” over
the water contained in the geologic formation. I will attempt to explain briefly the reasons for this in
the following paragraphs.
3.2. The Concept of Sovereignty
“Sovereignty” is a concept whose meaning is ambiguous and often indeterminate in international
law. Whether it even has a place in describing the relations between states has been questioned. Louis
Henkin, one of the world’s leading authorities on international law over the past half-century, has said
the following in a paper entitled “The Mythology of Sovereignty”: “As applied to states in their
relations with other states, ‘sovereignty’ is a mistake. Sovereignty is essentially an internal concept,
the locus of ultimate authority in a society, rooted in its origins in the authority of sovereign princes.
… Surely, as applied to the modern secular state in relation to other secular states, it is not meaningful
to speak of the state as sovereign. Sovereignty, I conclude, is not per se a normative conception in
international law.” (Henkin, 1993; see also Henkin, 1994.)
Indeed the very notion of state sovereignty was conceived by its creator, Jean Bodin, in 1576 as
applying to the internal political order of nations rather than to their relations with other states. Thus
understood, a nation’s sovereign, or supreme power, a single source of authority, was an essential
attribute of statehood – indeed, for Bodin, the defining characteristic of a state. (Bodin, 1576.)
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It is true that Article 2 of the United Nations Charter recognizes the principle of the “sovereign
equality” of states. But that principle merely confirms that all nations are equal under the law; it says
nothing suggesting that they are not subject to law. The principle that a state is sovereign over its
territory is also unquestioned – and indeed flows from Bodin’s theory. But that is of little help in
determining rights in shared natural resources – whether water or migratory birds – which are typically
transient things that do not remain in or form part of a state’s territory.
3.3. Sovereignty and State Practice concerning International Watercourses
The idea that a state can have “sovereignty” over such resources is not only unhelpful; it can in
fact be pernicious, in that it can lead to a “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968), or worse. The
misuse of the doctrine of sovereignty is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in the context of a
dispute between the United States and Mexico over the Rio Grande in the late 19th century. Upstream
agricultural development in the United States had allegedly caused water shortages in Mexico, whose
uses were prior to those in the United States. The US Attorney-General, Judson Harmon, was asked
for his views as to the law governing the use of the river by the two countries. In an opinion that has
gained well-deserved infamy as the “Harmon Doctrine”, the Attorney-General stated in part as
follows: “The fundamental principle of international law is the absolute sovereignty of every nation, as
against all others, within its own territory …. The immediate as well as the possible consequences of
the right asserted by Mexico [to a share of Rio Grande waters] show that its recognition is entirely
inconsistent with the sovereignty of the United States over its national domain ….” (Harmon, 1898.)
However, governments – including that of the United States – have found that in practice,
sovereignty is not a good or even a particularly advantageous organizing principle when it comes to
shared freshwater resources. For example, the very dispute in which Harmon announced his opinion
was resolved by a 1906 agreement between the US and Mexico entitled the “Convention concerning
the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes”. This shows that
the United States was not prepared to insist on Harmon’s extreme position but instead sought a
balanced resolution to the controversy. In 1944, the US concluded another agreement with Mexico
concerning shared watercourses. During the negotiation of the treaty the State Department’s Legal
Adviser prepared a review of existing agreements concerning shared freshwater resources. He
concluded that: “No one of these agreements adopts the early theory advanced by Attorney-General
Harmon. … On the contrary, the rights of the subjacent state are specifically recognized and protected
by these agreements.” (Hackworth, 1942.) During the hearings on the treaty in the U.S. Senate, three
executive branch officials challenged the assertion that the Harmon opinion correctly stated the law.
(McCaffrey, 2007, 105-106.) One observed: “Attorney-General Harmon’s opinion has never been
followed either by the United States or by any other country of which I am aware.” (English, 1945.)
Finally, in a dispute with Canada over the Columbia River – on which the United States is downstream
– the US government stated that the Harmon Doctrine “is not part of international law”. (Bloomfield
and Fitzgerald, 1958.) Thus, the infamous “Harmon Doctrine,” which I have argued elsewhere was
effectively stillborn (McCaffrey, 2007), was disavowed by the country of its creation – which in any
event never followed it in practice.
3.4. Should Agreements Based on the ILC’s Aquifers Articles Incorporate the Concept of Sovereignty?
It will be clear from the foregoing that I do not believe it would be either practical or wise for any
agreement based on the ILC’s Aquifers articles to incorporate the concept of “sovereignty of aquifer
states”. It would also be inconsistent with the modern law of international watercourses.
In the water disputes that have come before it recently, the International Court of Justice has
emphasized that there is a “basic right to an equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of an
international watercourse” (ICJ, 1997); that there is a community of interest in internationally shared
fresh water (ICJ, 1997); that adequate protection of international watercourses requires close
cooperation (ICJ, 2010); and that the principle of prevention of harm to the environment of another
state is now part of customary international law (ICJ, 2010). The notion of sovereignty of aquifer
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states would work at cross-purposes with all of these principles. Two quotations from the Court’s
most recent judgment regarding a water dispute, in the Pulp Mills case, will illustrate the point.
First, the Court stated: “[procedural] obligations are all the more vital when a shared resource is
at issue, as in the case of the River Uruguay, which can only be protected through close and
continuous co-operation between the riparian States.” (ICJ, 2010, para. 81.) Cooperation, which
connotes working together, will not be promoted by a doctrine that connotes unilateralism and
exclusivity. Second, the Court also found in that case that “the principle of prevention, as a customary
rule, has its origins in the due diligence that is required of a State in its territory. It is ‘every State’s
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.’
... A State is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take
place in its territory … causing significant damage to the environment of another State. The Court has
established that this obligation ‘is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the
environment’ ….” (ICJ, 2010, para. 101.) Observance of these obligations of due diligence and
prevention of transboundary harm will hardly be encouraged by a principle of sovereignty of aquifer
states.

4. HARMONIZING THE AQUIFERS ARTICLES WITH CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
WATER LAW
Two categories of revisions to the ILC’s Aquifers articles are necessary to harmonize them with
the contemporary law of international watercourses – including both surface water and groundwater.
First, the overlaps as between the Aquifers articles and the UN Watercourses convention should be
eliminated. This would require confining the scope of the articles ratione materiae to aquifers that do
not interact with surface water, i.e., do not receive significant recharge. Second, the “general
principle” of the “sovereignty of aquifer States” should be revised to emphasize the importance of
cooperation among states sharing transboundary groundwater. There are several steps that should be
taken to accomplish these revisions. First, the subject matter of the draft should be transboundary
“groundwater” rather than transboundary “aquifers”. This would be more consistent with the UN
Watercourses Convention and would shift the focus of attention from the rock to the water, where it
should be. Second, the Article 3 should be revised along the following lines:
Article 3
Cooperation between Groundwater States
Aquifer States shall cooperate in the protection, use and joint management of
transboundary groundwater in accordance with the present articles.
And third, the very valuable material in the draft concerning shared groundwater that interacts with
surface water – which, as suggested above, should be eliminated from a transboundary groundwater
draft because it overlaps with the UN Convention – should be made the subject of a “practice guide”
or the like, similar to that which is being prepared by the ILC on Reservations to Treaties. The ILC’s
work on reservations is not intended to become an international agreement. Instead, it is designed to
provide guidance to states on the difficult subject of reservations to treaties. Much of what is currently
contained in the Aquifers articles could form the basis of a similar practice guide for the management
of shared groundwater and the protection of aquifers.

5. CONCLUSION
International law requires cooperation between states sharing freshwater resources. The
International Court has said that states have a community of interest in those resources and that they
must cooperate closely and continuously in their management and protection. These principles are not
compatible with the notion of sovereignty of aquifer states. Not only is the concept of sovereignty
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inappropriate legally in this context, but it also sends precisely the wrong message: one of
unilateralism and exclusive authority and control, rather than one of cooperation and joint
management. The UN Watercourses Convention, whose basic principles are generally regarded as
codifications of customary international law, contains no corresponding provision. The ILC’s
Aquifers articles should be harmonized with the UN Convention to provide states with proper
guidance in the use and cooperative management of this increasingly vital resource.
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